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INTERACTION AND INFORMATION IN GROUP RISK TAKING
by
RICHARD ST. JEAN
The purpose of the present investigation was to examine sane of 
the processes involved in group risk taking. Brown's value hypothesis 
holds that people value risk individually and that this tendency becomes 
enhanced when they become aware of the amount of risk that others are 
willing to take. A second possibility is that people initially value 
riekbutthat the change-inducing process involves the production and 
recognition of substantive arguments relevant to the taking of a risky 
or conservative position. Thus, an immediate aim of the study was to 
single out the relative contributions of these two agents, risk-level 
exchange and the development of relevant arguments, to the production of 
risk-taking shifts in groups.
A second concern was with the effect of interactional processes on 
risk-taking behavior. Three major theories of the shift to risk (leader­
ship, responsibility-diffusion, and value theory) have maintained that 
face-to-face interaction is a necessary antecedent of the shift to risk 
while one (familiarization) has held that it is not. The present experiment 
attempted to examine more closely the effects of this factor by presenting 
the same information in both group and non-group contexts.
With respect to the above aims and on the basis of value theory
vii
considerations the following hypotheses were tested: 1) the shift to
risk will be greater in group than in alone conditions; 2) both risk- 
level information and pro and con information (substantive arguments) 
are necessary for the occurrence of a full risky shift and, further, when 
presented alone each would occasion a small risky shift; 3) risk-level 
information will be as effective in a group as in an alone setting, but 
pro and con information will be more effective in an interactional setting.
These hypotheses were tested experimentally by means of a 4 x 2 
x 2 factorial design including an information factor, a social interaction 
factor, and a pre-post factor. Hie four levels of information were full 
information, pro and con information, risk-level information and no 
information (control group). Each level of information occurred for both 
a group condition and an alone condition. Fifteen subjects served in 
each of the experimental cells formed by the combination of these two 
factors. The pre- and posttests constituted a repeated-measures factor 
for each subject.
The results confirmed the hypothesis that social interaction 
increases the shift to risk. However, the second and third hypotheses 
were explicitly disconfirmed. Full risky shifts were obtained from pro 
and con information, but only small insignificant shifts for risk-level 
infornation. Further, in the alone condition there was no shift whatsoever 
for risk-level information, but a small shift for pro and con information.
Discussion of the results focused on the formulation of a relevant- 
argument hypothesis as a more viable theoretical proposition than Brown's 
risk-level explanation. This hypothesis holds that substantive 
arguments relevant to the risky action are the major cause of the shift 
to risk and, further, that the effect of these arguments are greatly
viii
heightened when developed in a group setting, implications of this hypothesis 
and suggestions for future research were considered.in detail.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a surge of research dealing with 
the parameters of risk in decision making (e.g. Kogan and Wallach, 1964, 
1967b; Edwards and Slovic, 1965; Slovic, 1962; Pruitt, 1962). The 
parameter of risk is involved whenever there is a desireable goal, a lack 
of certainty that it can be readied, and possible negative consequences 
for failure (i.e. a prize, sane probability of attaining it, and a stake). 
The situation may be one in which these ocnponents are relatively objective 
as, for exanple, the decision to stake a certain sum of money for a prize 
of known value with a stated probability of success. On the other hand, 
the canponents may be relatively subjective, as when one decides to leave 
a relatively secure but dull job for a position that offers excitement 
and challenge but no long-term stability. In both cases risk taking is 
involved when the individual elects to stake sane thing of value on a 
desireable, but uncertain outcome.
The social psychologist becomes involved when the risky decision 
making is shared with others. Many important decisions are made in groups 
rather than by individuals working alone. Our age of participatory 
democracy demands that all decisions, small or large, be taken out of the 
hands of the autocratic individual and given to the egalitarian group.
In the modem academic world conmittee meetings have become a vray of life. 
Suppose, for exanple, the admissions conmittee of College X is faced with 
the decision of whether or not to enroll culturally disadvantaged youths 
at the risk of lowering academic standards. How much risk will they be 
willing to tolerate? In many problem situations where an element of
1
2clanger or risk is involved the final decision will emerge only after many 
long hours of group discussion. The question to be explored in this paper 
is the relationship between the experience of group interaction and the 
riskiness of the final decision.
From a logical standpoint there are three possible answers that 
might be given to this question. Kogan and Wallach (1967b) give an 
extensive discussion of these possibilities.
First, the traditional view has been that group decisions will 
be more conservative than individual decisions. Groups have been thought 
to exert a conventionalizing or conforming influence upon their constituent 
members. The participants in the decision-making conference are less 
likely to suggest novel or risky ideas for fear of group sanction. This 
claim was set forth by Whyte (1956) in an invective against the process 
of conmittee decision making in business settings. In his view, this 
practice has a suppressing influence on boldness and innovation. Sane 
indirect support has been found for this proposition. Zander and Medow 
(1963) found that subjects working in teams more often lowered their 
aspirations following a poor performance than did those working individually. 
It is possible in this case that shared experiences of failure may have 
suppressed any risk-taking proclivities and, thus, have led to advocating 
a more cautious decision. In other words, while this finding offers some 
support for Whyte's thesis, it might be difficult to generalize it beyond 
those instances in which a failure of aspiration is involved. In a syl­
logistic reasoning task Bamlund (1959) found that groups are more careful 
than individuals in the implications they draw. However, caution in form­
ing conclusions may or may not be related to the propensity to take risks.
A second, and perhaps more compelling view, is that the degree 
of riskiness characteristic of group decisions somehow represents an
3averaging of individual decisions. After reviewing a number of empirical 
studies Cartwright and Zander (1960) concluded that this is probably the 
case. Their interpretation is that group matters tend to exert direct 
influence attempts towards those who deviate in any direction. This 
interpretation receives seme support from Schachter's (1951) observation 
that when deviates are perceived as moving towards the group norm there 
is a gradual cessation of influence attempts. More direct support canes 
fran a study by Hunt and Rowe (1960) which reports that there was little 
or no difference in the riskiness of investment decisions made by groups 
in contrast with those made by individuals. This study has been criticized 
by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962) on the grounds of methodology. They 
feel that since group interaction was quite brief (15 minutes) and since 
the groups met within sight of one another the results should be considered 
inconclusive. However, several recent studies in group risk taking 
(Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Zajonc, Wolosin, Wblosin and Loh, 1970) have 
evolved procedures utilizing interaction experiences lasting considerably 
less than 15 minutes, yet with results replicating studies using longer 
procedures. Other studies (e.g. Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970) 
have shown that valid results may be obtained even when groups meet within 
sight of one another.
A third possibility is that group decisions may often be more 
risky than the average of individual decisions. Bruner (1962), for 
exanple, feels that the process of group interaction in itself encourages 
greater risk taking. The rationale for this view is that groups usually 
face the task of finding solutions to problems which individuals have not 
been able to solve. If this is the case group members would have no 
reason to fear failure and, thus, should feel free to promote risky or 
unconventional alternatives. Osborne (1957) has indicated that group
4interaction will lead to the proposed of novel and venturesome ideas if 
the principles of ''brainstorming" are followed. In an empirical test of 
this contention, Taylor, Berry and Block (1958) found that groups following 
these principles actually produced fewer ideas than individuals working 
alone. This finding was corroborated by Dunnette, Campbell and Jaastad 
(1963) in a study using industrial work groups. While these studies are 
suggestive neither focused on the risk-taking aspects of the decision 
task. It should be noted that the Synectics approach developed by Gordon 
(1961) claims to focus creative resources within a group onto a problem 
situation in such a fashion that imaginative and innovative concepts are 
developed.
The above studies offer no systematic basis for distinguishing 
between group and individual risk taking. Seme of these have not been 
directly concerned with the dimension of risk and others have suffered 
from methodological difficulties. Kogan and Wallach (1967b) have indicated 
that studies in this area should fulfill at least two requirements. First, 
subjects should be fully involved with the risk-taking aspects of the 
problems. In other words, risk taking should be a prominent dimension of 
the problem situation. Secondly, group conditions should be structured 
in such a manner that they capture the full essentials of an intensive 
discussion. Vhen these prescriptions are met the results of such studies 
are fairly uniform.
The Shift to Risk Phenomenon
Ihe effect called the shift-to-risk-phencmenon was first reported 
by Stoner (1961) in a master's thesis submitted to the School of Industrial
Management at M.I.T. Stoner asked his subjects to resolve a number of 
"life-dilerma" situations in which the solutions available varied system­
5atically in terms of their riskiness. Subjects first made their decisions 
alone and then were formed into groups where they discussed each problem 
until a final consensus was established. The basic finding was that 
group decisions were significantly more risky than the average of individual 
decisions prior to group discussion.
In this experiment Stoner used the Choice Dilemmas Task, devised
by Wallach and Kogan (1959) for use in assessing individual risk taking.
This instrument takes the form of a questionnaire containing 12 problem
situations. Each situation depicts a dilemma involving a central figure
who must choose between two courses of action. One course is consistently
more attractive than the other but has a smaller probability of succeeding.
To illustrate this point a typical item is reproduced:
Mr. Gi, a competent chess player, is participating in a national chess 
tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored player in the 
tournament as his opponent. Mr. G. has been given a relatively lew 
ranking in view of his performance in previous tournaments. During 
the course of play Mr. G. notes the possibility of a deceptive but 
risky maneuver which might bring him a quid; victory. At the same 
time, if the attempted maneuver should fail, Mr. G. would be left 
in an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly follow.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. G. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that Mr. G. 's deceptive play would succeed.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
for the risky play in question to be attempted.
Odds are listed as 1 in 10, 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in 10, 9 in 10, and 10 in
10.
All subjects are given a standard set of instructions indicating 
that they are to read each problem and check the lowest probability level 
deemed acceptable for attempting the risky alternative involved. They 
are further instructed that in all cases they are to keep in mind that 
the risky alternative, if successful, would be the more desirable for the 
central figure involved. A risk score is ccnputed for each subject by 
sunming the probability levels he has chosen for the various problems.
6A comparison is then made betvreen risk scores in individual and group 
conditions.
Using the same methodology Wallach, Kogan and Ban (1962) replicated 
Stoner's original finding. They reasoned that since Stoner's subjects 
were male graduate students in industrial management the shift to risk 
might be accounted for by the mutually-shared role expectations of this 
group. That is, the presence of peers nay have served to remind each 
subject that a business executive is expected to take risks in his decision 
making. Tto control for this possible effect the experimenters used groups 
composed of either all male or all female undergraduates enrolled in a 
liberal-arts curriculum. Previously unacquainted subjects were used in 
order to insure that the outcome could not be attributed to fortuitous 
associations between in-group ;status and risk-taking dispositions. The 
results of this study were essentially the same as Stoner's. Group 
decisions exhibited a shift toward greater risk taking when compared 
with prediscussion individual decisions. This held for both sexes. An 
interesting fact is that private decisions made after group discussion 
exhibited the same increase in riskiness as appeared in group decisions. 
Evidently, the shift to risk is a matter of private as well as public 
acceptance. In addition, this increase in riskiness was maintained even 
after a period of two to six wBeks had elapsed subsequent to group discussion.
An important question concerning this shift is whether or not it 
can be generalized from the original experimental paradigm. It should be 
noted that the phenomenon has been obtained principally through the use 
of the hypothetical questions (Wallach and Kogan, 1959). Is this effect 
restricted to hypothetical problems or will it also be found in actual 
risk-taking situations where the welfare of the group participants is 
involved? Four studies have addressed themselves to this question.
7The first study (wallach, Kogan and Ben, 1964) involved a system 
of risks associated with possible monetary gains and losses contingent 
upon the subject's performance on a set of problem-solving items. Subjects 
were asked to decide upon the difficulty level of the problem they would 
attempt to solve. The payoff scale was proportionate to the stated diffi­
culty level; harder items paid greater dividends. The major finding was 
that when groups discussed to consensus the difficulty levels to be chosen 
the resulting decisions favored higher difficulty levels (and, thus, a 
greater degree of risk) than did the average of individual decisions.
A second experiment (Bern, Wallach and Kogan, 1965) involved 
the threat of aversive consequences for the failure of risky decisions.
These consequences consisted of painful side effects resulting from ex­
posure to various unpleasant odors. Odors which had a greater likelihood 
of producing the side effects paid proportionately higher premiums provided, 
of course, that the subject did not actually get the effects. Thus, the 
consequences of failure involved both unpleasant physiological stimulation 
and the foregoing of potential monetary gains. When groups discussed the 
probability levels involved they reached decisions that were significantly 
more risky than the average of individual decisions.
A study by Pruitt and Teger (1969) has extended the generality 
of the risky shift to gambling decisions. Subjects first filled out a 
questionnaire indicating either for a fixed stake what probability of 
winning they would like to have or for a fixed probability of winning the 
amount of money they would like to risk. All bets were of zero expected 
value; over a long series subjects should break even. There vas actual 
risk involved since one bet was chosen at random by the experimenter and 
played off on the roulette wheel. Bets were first decided upon individually 
and then were discussed by groups. The results indicated that a
8significantly greater degree of risk was decided upon following group 
discussion than prior to it.
The shift effect has also been found among groups with previous 
professional experience in decisionmaking tasks. Siegel and Zajonc 
(1967) administered a set of hypothetical items to a number of 3-man 
groups, each ocnposed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a social 
worker. These groups discussed 12 items— 6 drawn from the Choice Dilemmas 
Task (1959) and 6 "clinical choice dilemas" devised by the authors to 
reflect the type of mental-health problems these groups had previously 
worked with. The basic finding was that a large and significant shift 
to risk occurred on both sets of items. This shift was just as great for 
the clinical items as for the items drawn from the Wallach and Kogan list. 
Thus, the risky shift was demonstrated for established groups working on 
familiar problems.
Taken together, these four studies provide strong support for the 
idea that groups will shift to risk in actual as well as in hypothetical 
situations. The question is what mechanisms operate in the context of 
group discussion that do not operate in individual decision making.
Explanations of the Shift to Risk
A number of explanations have been put forth in an attempt to 
explain the consistency of the group shift to risk. In recent years a 
large body of research has been devoted to the testing of these hypotheses.
Risk Taking as a Function of Leadership Influence
A plausible explanation for this phenomenon might be that those 
individuals who are high risk takers in the beginning exert more influence 
in group discussion than those who are initially moderate or low.
9Evidence to support this view was found by wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962). 
Following discussion, group members were asked to rate each other in 
terms of interpersonal influence. Hie result was that those individuals 
who exhibited the greatest degree of risk on the pretest measures were 
perceived by other group members to be more influential in the discussion. 
In a later study (Wallach and Kogan, 1965), it was found that even when 
groups are not required to reach a consensus in the discussion the rela­
tionship between initial risk and perceived influence still persists. In 
addition, Rim (1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1966) has reported that high risk 
takers rate high an measures of extraversion, need for achievement, 
tolerance of ambiguity, radicalism, and interpersonal values of leadership 
and recognition. Thus, the suggestion is that high risk takers are 
characterized by a particular constellation of personality traits which 
may predipose them to leadership.
There remains a plausible alternative explanation for this 
evidence. It is possible that the perceived influence of high risk 
takers was an outgrowth of the group shift to risk rather than being a 
cause of it. It seems natural that those who were originally closest to 
the final group product should be perceived as having exerted the greatest 
influence. It is likely that this could occur even without the consensus 
requirement since wallach, Kogan and Burt (1965) have reported that group 
members recognize that the shift is taking place.
Evidence far this second point of view canes fran two studies 
(Nbrdhpjy, 1962; Rabcw, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller and Shibuya, 1966).
In both studies items were created for which the result was a shift to 
greater conservatism following group discussion. This shift was ac- 
catpanied by the finding that those who were initially lowest on risk 
taking were perceived as having exerted the greatest influence. Is it
10
possible that high risk takers are persuasive in sane situations but not 
in others? The more parsimonious view holds that perceived influence is 
a result of the group moving in a particular direction. However, Kogan 
and Wallach (1967b) feel that the evidence on this point remains ambiguous 
since "there may be something special about the kinds of items in question 
that cause the high risk taker to change his mind (p. 257)
At any rate, it would appear that recently a number of decisive 
blows have been struck against the leadership hypothesis. Teger and 
Pruitt (1967), for example, managed to obtain a risky shift in a condition 
where the subjects did not engage in discussion but simply revealed to 
one another information about their initial choices. No verbal ccmnunica- 
tion was involved since information was exchanged simply by displaying 
cards inscribed with probability values. In this situation high risk 
takers had no opportunity to be persuasive yet a risky shift was still 
obtained. Although it may be argued that sane influence still took place 
it would hardly be fair to attribute this influence to the personality 
of the high risk taker. The findings seem to support some sort of cultural 
value mechanism (discussed later) rather than a leadership explanation.
In a recent study Wallach, Kogan and Burt (1968) attempted to 
determine if the shift to risk could be attributed to greater persuasive­
ness on the part of risk takers than an the part of conservatives. On 
the basis of responses to the Choice Dilenroas Task discussion groups were 
formed such that the variability of risk-taking dispositions within each 
group was extremely high. Each group then discussed risk-neutral material 
and each of the members was rated in terms of perceived influence. Use 
of risk-neutral materials prevented the possible contaminating influence 
of a shift to risk making the high risk taker appear more persuasive. 
Results indicated that for males there was no relation between riskiness
11
and perceived influence. Far female groups there was a slight positive 
relationship between riskiness and perceived influence. Die authors 
conclude that, in general, the risky shift cannot be attributed to greater 
persuasiveness on the part of risk takers.
Just the opposite approach was taken in a very recent study by 
Hoyt and Stoner (1968). Subjects were assigned to discussion groups on 
the basis of risk-taking homogeneity rather than heterogeneity. It was 
assumed that this procedure would neutralize any leadership effects of 
high risk takers and, according to the leadership hypothesis, prevent a 
risky shift from occurring. Despite this procedure substantial risky 
shifts were produced in the following discussions. This evidence combined 
with that of the two previously reported studies indicates that the leader- 
ship hypothesis does not provide a very adequate explanation of the shift 
to risk.‘
Diffusion of Responsibility
By far, the greatest amount of empirical research in this field 
has been accomplished through the efforts of Wallach, Kogan, and their 
collaborators. They have proposed that "...individuals, when constituted 
as a group, experience a diffusion of responsibility as a product of the 
knowledge that one is deciding upon an action jointly with others rather 
than deciding by oneself (wallach, Kogan and Bern, 1964, p. 263)." They 
further report that responsibility diffusion is mediated by the formation 
of affective bends which enables the individual group member to feel less 
than proportionately to blame when he considers the possibility of failure. 
Rettig (1966) offers the similar explanation that the process of ocmruni- 
cation set in motion by grcup discussion may result in a lowered expectancy 
of being censured and a greater feeling of security. His study, however,
12
is concerned with predicted ethical risk taking in Which the social 
desirability of the risky action is low.
Kogan and wallach feel that the notion of responsibility diffusion 
has received strong support in several studies. In one, (wallach, Kogan 
and Burt, 1967) groups were ccnposed homogeneously of either field- 
dependent or field-independent members. It was found that longer discus­
sions of field-dependent groups resulted in a stronger risky shift whereas 
longer discussions among the field-independents weakened the shift. The 
authors reasoned that longer discussions enhanced the affective bonds 
among the field-dependents. Among the field-independents longer discus­
sions were characterized by a more intellectual or cognitive style of 
discussion which, they assume, is not conducive to the formation of 
emotional ties. In addition, they found significant positive correlations 
between the amount of risky shift exhibited by a field-dependent member 
and the degree of risky shift he attributed to the group of which he was 
a member. It is held that this process of projecting one's own behavior 
onto the group can be seen as a means far minimizing personal responsibility. 
No such relationship was found for the field-independents who, presumably, 
are not prone to minimizing personal responsibility.
Kogan and wallach (1967a) found that groups ccnposed homogeneously 
of high test-anxious subjects exhibited a stronger shift to risk than 
randomly ccnposed groups. The interpretation is that high-anxious indi­
viduals are more than normally concerned about negative outcomes and, thus, 
have more responsibility to diffuse. This idea was also supported through 
a study performed by wallach, Kogan and Bern (1964). One of the manipula­
tions involved setting up a condition in which one subject was induced 
to feel responsible for the wins and losses of others in the group as 
well as his own. When these "responsible" subjects arrived at a decision
13
after discussion with other group matters they manifested a strong shift 
to risk. The authors interpret this to he a consequence of the fact that 
the individuals involved felt a greater than usual amount of responsibility 
and, thus, had more responsibility to diffuse.
It is interesting to note that Marquis (1962) obtained the same 
results in a similar study, yet drew opposite conclusions. Marquis reasoned 
that since one member is deemed to be responsible he should not have the 
same freedom as other group members to experience a diffusion of responsi­
bility. . Since a shift to risk was obtained anyway Marquis concluded that 
responsibility diffusion could not account for the results.
It would seem that the above evidence is rather equivocal with
respect to the theory. On the basis of their results, Fabow et. al. (1966)
conclude that diffusion of responsibility, although not ruled out, is
insufficient to account for all the data. The Rabcw study utilized items
for which there was a shift to greater conservatism rather than risk.
These items were constructed on the basis of a norm-conflict prescription
in which the cautious alternative is supported by societal norms whereas
the more desirable and risky alternative does not receive normative
support. To illustrate this point a typical item is reproduced:
A very small ccmrunity has sponsored the medical education of a young 
doctor in order to replace the older and only doctor of that community. 
The young doctor mist decide whether or not to follow up a research 
idea which may produce an important medical advance, a decision that 
will prevent him from returning to the small ccmrunity (p. 20).
In this case each subject is asked to decide what the odds should be of
the research being a success before he would advise the doctor to follow
up his idea.
Responsibility diffusion was formulated to account for shifts to 
risk, not shifts to conservation. It cannot be invoked to account far 
both because then it would be no explanation at all. However, Kogan and
14
Wallach (1967b) have attacked the Rabcw study on the grounds that the
risky alternative does not appear to be of much greater desirability
than the cautious alternative. This criticism, though, can also be
applied to an item used by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1962) for which risky
shifts have been observed:
A college senior with considerable musical talent must choose between 
the secure course of going on to medical school and beaming a 
physician, or the risky course of embarking on the career of a concert 
pianist (p. 77).
It would not appear from the item itself that beaming a concert pianist 
is more desirable than going to medical school. Yet, it must be remembered 
that the instructions urge the subject to always keep in mind that the 
risky alternative is more desirable to the central figure involved.
Since Rabow et. al. used the same instructions this criticism of Kogan 
and Wallach must be considered untenable.
Before leaving this issue it is necessary to consider one more 
test of the responsibility-diffusion hypothesis. Pruitt and Teger (1967) 
report a study in which they vised an actual gambling situation in order 
to insure that there would be a concrete outcome to give seme substance 
to feelings of responsibility. Subjects first answered items about the 
amount of money they would be willing to risk and what odds they would 
be willing to take. Next, they met in small groups to discuss seme non- 
risk items. It was assumed that group interaction would allow the affec­
tive bonds to develop which are supposed to mediate diffusion of responsi­
bility. Following group discussion, subjects were told to make new 
decisions on the gambling items with the instruction that their decisions 
would be averaged with those of other group members. This would produce 
a final group decision which was to be played off for money.
The authors reasoned that this procedure should promote diffusion 
of responsibility since all of the group members were participating in
15
the final group decision. Instead of producing shifts to risk, this 
procedure resulted in nonsignificant shifts toward conservatism. This 
finding would seem to iitply that responsibility-diffusion, if it does 
occur, is not sufficient to produce the shift toward risk. In a personal 
statement to Pruitt and Teger (cited in Pruitt and Teger, 1967), Kogan 
cemented that responsibility-dif fusion would occur only if information 
is available about the level of risk that other group members are taking. 
However, as Pruitt and Teger point out, if this is the case then the 
responsibility-diffusion hypothesis needs to be restated. As it stands 
new it does not provide a very adequate explanation.
Risk Taking through Familiarization
Recently, Bateson (1966) has proposed a familiarization hypothesis 
which maintains that a more thorough consideration and understanding of 
the risk-taking problems on the part of the subjects involved may in 
itself lead to greater riskiness on the post test measure. He has supported 
this contention through utilization of a procedure in which subjects, 
after completing the pretest, are instructed to familiarize themselves 
with the Choice Dilenma items by writing out pros and cons for each action. 
A significant shift to risk was observed on the posttest measures, This 
shift was of approximately the same magnitude as that obtained in the 
group discussion procedure. In interpreting these results Bateson argues 
that group discussion may result in a greater familiarization with the 
relevant facts of the problem and that greater familiarization in itself 
leads to a greater willingness to advocate risky solutions. A study by 
Flanders and Thistlethwaite (1967) augments this argunent. They found 
that familiarization produced as great a shift as did discussion and, more 
importantly, that familiarization followed by discussion did not produce
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any greater magnitude in the shift to risk. They concluded that the shift 
to risk results fran a pseudo-rather than a true-group factor.
In acxeoent paper, however, Kogan and Wallach (1967c) have 
challenged the results of the familiarization studies. They set up two 
conditions, one of which was a typical group discussion while the other 
was a type of familiarization condition in which subjects listened to 
tape recordings of the group discussions. Risky shifts were manifested 
in both conditions, but the risky shifts under the discussion condition 
were significantly larger than under the familiarization-by-listening 
condition. They argued that the same information was available to groups 
in both conditions and that if familiarization alone were sufficient to 
account for the risky shift it should be of the same magnitude in both 
conditions. These results appear to contradict those reported by Flanders 
and Thistlethwaite.
A detailed investigation of the above studies reveals subtle 
differences in procedure. In their familiarization instructions Flanders 
and Thistlethwaite created in their subjects the explicit expectation 
that they were to prepare for a group discussion although, in actuality, 
no discussion was to follow. Part of their instructions read: "We want
each of you to be prepared to discuss the choices to be made so that you 
will not have to spend group discussion time restudying the problem (p. 93)." 
Kogan and Wallach, hcwever, did not lead their subjects to believe that 
they would engage in a group discussion or in any way make their decisions 
public. In a recent study at the University of New Hampshire (cited in 
Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970) this parameter was investigated. 
TWo familiarization conditions were used. In one, subjects wrote out pros 
and cons for the Choice Dilemmas Task while under the impression that they 
were to make new choices which would be revealed in subsequent group
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discussion. The subjects made posttest choices, but no discussion followed. 
In thft-other familiarization condition subjects also wrote out pros and 
cons but while under the impression that their subsequent choices would 
remain private. In addition, a traditional group-discussion procedure 
was run for purposes of octrparison. Significant shifts to risk were found 
after group discussion but, surprisingly, neither familiarization condition 
produced significant shifts in either direction.
A number of other attempts have been made to replicate the familiar­
ization studies (Teger, Pruitt, St. Jean and Haaland, 1970). Several 
familiarization procedures have been used including exact replications of 
both Batesonvs and Flanders's and Thistlethwaite1s procedures. In none 
of these studies has a significant shift to risk been observed. It now 
seems likely that the shift observed in the Kogan and Whllach familiariza­
tion condition was an outgrowth of subjects' vicarious experiencing of 
group interaction. Bateson's shift may have been due to the fact that 
his study was run in England and English students may be prone to studying 
a problem carefully before making a decision. Thus, on the pretest 
subjects may have been hesitant to accept a great deed, of risk since they 
had not had time to study the problems carefully. However, unless we 
assume a Type I error it is extremely difficult to account for the results 
of Flanders and Thistlethwaite.
The comprehension hypothesis has still another shortcoming. It 
explains only shifts to risk, not shifts to conservatism, in order to 
explain both types of shifts it would have to be oombined with some 
other explanation such as value theory discussed next.
Risk Taking as a Function of Value Orientation
In an attempt to explain both shifts to risk and shifts to
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conservatism Brown (1965) has proposed a "value" hypothesis. He feels 
that the content of the traditional risk-taking items has been such that 
the risky alternatives involved are more apt to be supported by cultural 
or societal values than are the conservative ones. Thus, subjects perceive 
most of the Choice Dilemma items as warranting a risky approach. It will 
be noted that American culture supports the talcing of risks in many concrete 
situations— in quiz shews, in sports, on the battlefield, etc. Madaras 
and Bern (1968) have shewn that risk-acceptors, in general, are seen as 
having more socially-desirable characteristics than risk-rejectors. How­
ever, in seme situations the approved approach is a conservative one. 
Therefore, Brown asserts that people value both risk and caution according 
to the circumstances and a risk-taking item may engage either the value 
on risk or the value on caution. Whichever value is engaged will influence 
the flew of information in such a manner that group members will bring 
forth more statements supporting the value than opposing it. Thus, it 
might be supposed that if more information is brought out supporting a 
risk approach the grcup would shift in that direction.
Seme support for this notion has been obtained by Nordhfy (1962) 
who analyzed the verbal content of grcup discussions of the Choice Dilemma 
items. For 10 of the 12 items there were a greater number of statements 
supporting risk than caution. These were the same items for which there 
were shifts to risk. For the other two items there were a greater number 
of statements supporting the conservative alternatives. These items 
showed nonsignificant shifts toward conservatism. However, Wallach and 
Kogan (1967b) have argued that this finding dees not necessarily support 
the value position. They claim that if groups are going to shift to risk 
anyway a natural outgrowth of this process would be the production of 
a greater number of statements justifying a risky approach. In this
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instance, therefore, it is difficult to ascertain which is the cause and 
which the effect.
Hinds (1962) has reported results which have more significance 
for value theory. In conjunction with the administration of the Choice 
Dilenroa items he asked his subjects to indicate what alternatives would 
be chosen by most other people. Subjects consistently guessed that others 
would be more conservative. Brown interprets this to mean that each 
person taking the test conceives himself to be at least as risky as the 
average of his peers. Thus, the process of group discussion serves to 
inform each subject of how other group members have actually chosen. The 
shift to risk occurs since those who find themselves to be belcw the 
average will revise their decisions in an upward direction. On the norm- 
oonflict items devised by Rabcw et. al. (1966) the theory is that subjects 
originally define the items as warranting a cautious approach and assume 
that the/ are being at least as cautious as others. When group discussion 
informs them that others are being even more conservative they recast 
their decisions into a more conservative framework. This theory, then, 
rests on the dual assumptions that people like to be in tune with the 
cultural values as they see them and, furthermore, when they find they 
are not they suffer a type of cognitive dissonance which results in deci­
sion change.
It should be noted that by this theory the actual flow of argnnents, 
the substantive aspect of the interaction, is not important in the pro­
duction of the shift: "The content of the discussion, the arguments pro
and con, are of no importance by this theory. It is the information about 
other people's answers that makes individuals move toward greater risk 
after group discussion (Brown, p. 702)." Die fact that more risky than 
cautious information is produced in group discussion may be seen as a
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justification for the already shifting decision.
A partial test of this theory was conducted by Whllach and Kogan 
(1965). They established a condition in which subjects were required 
to reach a consensus on each of the Choioe Dilemma items without engaging 
in discussion. The procedure called for the experimenter to post each 
subject's decision on the blackboard for all to refer to. Several rounds 
of choices were made in this fashion until consensus was achieved. Since 
each subject received information about the degree of risk taken by other 
group members Brown's theory would predict that those whose choices were 
less risky than the average would choose for greater risk on the next 
ballot. However, the final decisions represented an averaging effect 
rather than an overall shift.
Teger and Pruitt (1967) have criticized this study on the grounds 
that the consensus-vdthout-discussion requirement may have left the 
subjects with the irrpression that an averaging strategy was the only one 
available. Accordingly, the study was replicated without a consensus 
requirement and the posttest measures indicated a small but significant 
shift to risk. A larger shift to risk resulted from a comparison dis­
cussion condition. This finding can be considered to be compatible with 
the value theory. While the posting of decisions provides some informa­
tion about the views of others this opportunity should be greatly enhanced 
by the verbal exchange within group discussion.
Pruitt and Teger (1967) cite other evidence which they feel to 
be in line with the value theory. If each risk-taking item is originally 
defined as warranting either a risky or a conservative approach these 
values should be reflected by the initial choices on the pretest. In 
addition, there should be a positive correlation between initial risk 
and risky shift. Essentially, this is what Pruitt and Teger have found.
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Items for which choices are originally risky reflect a shift to even 
greater risk after discussion. Likewise, originally conservative choices 
become even more conservative. This is consistent with Brown's predic­
tion that a risk-taking item will engage one of the two values and, 
through group discussion, exhibit shifts in the value-specified direction.
These authors have further reasoned that the difference between 
initial risk and the risk others are assumed to be talcing (Hind's procedure) 
should, if the theory is right, yield a prediction of the size of the 
risky shift. The rationale is that "the farther ahead of the pack one 
initially thinks he is, the more catching up he has to do when he finds 
that he is performing in an average fashion (Pruitt and Teger, 1967; 
p. 16)." That is, there should be a positive correlation between risky 
shift and the amount of risk subjects assure others to be taking minus 
their own initial risk. Since small nonsignificant correlations were 
found this prediction was not borne out.
However, the relevance of this finding for value theory can be 
called into question. Brcwn's prediction was that those who find them­
selves to be below average will revise their decisions toward greater 
risk. They want to be at least as risky as others. Thus, it would not 
natter hew far ahead of the pack one assumes oneself to be. The only 
measure of relevance is whether or not one is actually belcw the mean 
of the other members' decisions. The shift to risk is based on a few 
individuals revising their decisions, not the whole group. One could 
predict, though, that degree of risky shift would bear seme relation to 
how far belcw the mean a group member finds himself to be.
This idea receives support from a very recent study by Vidmar 
(1969). On the basis of initial reactions to the risk items he determined 
each member's relative initial risk position in the group. Following the
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posttest choices it was found that magnitude of initial risky shift was 
inversely related to the member's relative initial position. Thus, those 
who were farthest below the mean shifted most. In addition, he compared 
homogeneous groups consisting of either high, medium or low risk takers 
with heterogeneous groups composed of two high, one medium, and two low 
risk members. All composition conditions exhibited shifts toward risk 
but groups in the heterogeneous condition showed significantly greater 
shifts than groups in the other conditions. Thus, as Brown predicts, it 
appears that heterogeneity of risk preferences is an important factor in 
the shift to risk.
It is interesting to note that Whllach appears to have abandoned 
the xresponsibility-diffusion hypothesis and embraced the value position.
He and his colleague report a study (Whllach and Wing, 1968) which represents 
a more extensive version of Hinds' (1962) report. Six of the twelve 
Choice Dilemma items were administered to almost 500 pre-college subjects. 
They responded with both their own risk preferences and those that they 
felt the majority of their peers would make. On all six items subjects 
guessed that the majority of their peers would make more conservative 
choices than they themselves. This is in line with value theory which 
suggests that on risk-oriented items (as these were) subjects would feel 
themselves to be as risky or riskier than the majority of their fellows. 
Wallach and Wing new feel that this "...interpretation may well account 
for the lion's share of the group-induced risky-shift effect (p. 105)."
The value explanation has been supported and extended by another 
similar study (Levinger and Schneider, 1969). The subjects involved 
responded to the Choice Dilemma items in three ways: (1) their own
preference, (2) how they felt their peers wculd choose, and (3) the choice 
they felt was most admirable. The authors felt that if, risk is a positive
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value the choice selected as most admirable would represent a riskier 
position than the initial choice. Although one is left with the question 
of why the subjects would not originally choose the most admirable 
position the results were in line with the hypothesis as stated. In 
general, subjects assumed peers to be more conservative and they most 
admired choices vdiich were riskier than their am. These results did not 
hold for those items in which previous research had indicated inconsistent 
shifts or shifts in the cautious direction. The authors suggest that 
during discussion the group members discover that the decisions of others 
are more risky than previously they believed and, thus, feel more freedom 
to move toward the positively-valued positions.
Perhaps the most catpelling evidence for value theory ccmes 
frcm the same researcher who first reported the occurrence of the shift 
to risk phenomenon. Stoner (1968) presented his subjects with a 12-item 
questionnaire. Six were assumed to be risk-shifting items, and the others 
were felt to be caution-shifting. Subjects also completed a "value 
ranking instrument" which required them to rank 18 phrases in the order 
of their perceived importance. The phrases were written to describe 
values which were implicit in each of the alternative outcomes in the 
12 dilemma items. On the basis of subjects' rankings the 12 dilenma items 
were divided into 2 groups: those for which the risk/ alternatives were 
ranked higher in importance than the cautious alternatives and those 
for which the opposite was true. If risk-taking items do engage widely 
held values and if the importance of relative values can be specified 
in this manner then this procedure should afford us a means of predicting 
which way any item will shift through group discussions. Stoner found 
that items classified in this way as being risk-oriented elicited 
relatively risky initial decisions and, after group discussion, evoked
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strong shifts to risk. Items for which the cautious alternatives were 
ranked of greater importance had relatively conservative initial decisions. 
Four of the six items classified in this way shifted in the conservative 
direction although only two of the shifts were significant, Thus, we 
have a means for predicting the direction of the shift in advance and, 
although the predictions were far from perfect, Stoner has shewn that 
value theory need not be an ex post facto explanation.
Statement of the Problem
At present, value theory is the only major explanation of the 
shift to risk phenomenon that has not suffered significant empirical 
damage. The problem is that there are two possible versions of this 
theory and previous tests of the value formulation have done nothing to 
separate them.
Brown's position (1965, pp. 698-702) is that any risk-taking item 
may elicit either the value on risk or the value on caution. People 
like to feel that they are acting in accord with the value specified and 
they respond originally in either a risky or conservative fashion. They 
assure that they are at least as risky or conservative as others. When 
some of them find that they are not they shift to a more extreme position 
on the value. According to Brown's position, then, the only information 
of relevance is the actual risk preferences of others. As mentioned, 
some support for this position has been given by Teger and Pruitt (1967) 
who have reported that when group members do nothing but exchange risk- 
level information there is a small but significant shift to risk.
The verbal interplay and the arguments pro and con should be of 
no importance (Brown, 1965). Yet, Nondhjfy's (1962) study indicates that 
risk-oriented items are accompanied by discussions in which there are a
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greater nuttier of statements supporting risk than caution. Wallach and 
Kogan (1967b) have argued that if groups are going to shift to risk any­
way a natural outgrowth of this process would be the production of a 
greater nutter of statements justifying a risky approach. But there is 
a second possibility. The flow of substantive arguments/ the pros and 
cons involved, may themselves play a causal role in the shift to risk.
It should be noted that a test of this second possibility also 
constitutes a crucial test of Brown's position. Brown would be forced 
to predict that no shift to risk would occur in a discussion of the risk- 
taking items in which the giving of specific risk-level information was 
not allowed. This proposition can be tested by means of an experimental 
design which compares the potency of various levels of information in 
the production of the shift to risk. Full information (the usual group 
discussion) is compared with two levels of partial information (a discussion 
which permits risk-level information only and one which permits pro and 
con information only). There is also a control group which represents 
the extreme of no information.
The hypothesis presented here is that both risk-level information 
and pro and con information are necessary for the production of a full 
risky shift. Teger and Pruitt (1967) found that groups will shift to 
risk when presented with risk-level information but that this shift is 
significantly smaller than that reported for the groups who used the 
traditional discussion method. Thus, it is expected that either risk- 
level information or pro and con information by itself will be sufficient 
for the production of a small risky shift. Yet for the full risky shift 
it nay be necessary for these two elements to be combined as they are 
in the typical group discussion procedure.
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Following the demise of the familiarization hypothesis it appeared 
that the shift to risk most be a true-gzoup phenomenon. That is, the 
shift Will only take place through the interaction (face-to-face exchange 
of behavior) of several individuals. Pushed to its logical extreme, 
however, Brown's value position must consider the shift to risk to be a 
pseudo-group effect. By this theory the only relevant variable is the 
acquisition of information concerning the risk levels of others. If this 
information is made available to subjects subsequent to the ccrpletion 
of the pretest they should choose greater risk on the posttest even in 
the absence of a group condition.
It is possible, however, that the flow of substantive arguments 
(pros and cons) are also basic elements of the shift to risk. This 
would seem to support the contention that the shift to risk is really a 
true-gzoup effect. Yet, might not this information alone produce the 
shift to risk when presented in an individual rather than a group context? 
A written transcript of a grcup discussion would provide the full infor­
mational requirements but without the interactional oonponents. If a 
shift to risk were to appear in this condition it would be necessary to 
conclude that actual face-to-face interaction is not crucial to the pro­
duction of the shift to risk. Teger and Kogan have contented that in 
this condition a grcup might be implied and if a shift were found it 
might better be termed a quasi- rather than a pseudo-group effect (per­
sonal ccmunication).
It is still possible that grcup interaction while it nay not 
be necessary to the production of the shift may serve to enhance it. 
Perhaps information presented in a group condition is more salient than 
when presented in an alone condition. The obverse is also a logical pos­
sibility but it seems intuitively more likely that group interaction
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would serve to make more pronounced the value specified by a risk-talcing 
item. Willems (1969) has reported that groups are even more likely than 
individuals to report that they are taking more risk than others. He 
interprets this to mean that group interaction enhances the value specified. 
Ihe position taken here is that the shift to risk can be produced in a 
noninteractional setting but that the addition of social interaction will 
serve to make the shift more pronounced.
The present design tests this contention by comparing the four 
information levels across both group and alone conditions. This analysis 
permits the identification of experimental interaction effects between 
the two major variables.
Hypotheses
The following specific predictions are offered:
(1) There will be a greater shift to risk under group than under alone 
conditions.
(2) The shift to risk will be greatest when full information is given, 
next greatest for risk-level only information and pro and con information, 
and smallest for the no-information condition. It is not expected that 
the risk level only condition and the pro and con condition will be 
significantly different.
(3) There will be a statistical interaction to the effect that the 
presentation of risk-level information will produce carparable shifts 
under both group and alone conditions, while shifts under the other infor­
mation levels will be smaller in the alone than in the group conditions.
That is, the magnitude of the shifts under full information and risk- 
level infatuation should be approximately the same for both levels of 
interaction while shifts under the pro and con level should be larger
in the group than in the alone conditions.
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METHOD
The overall experimental plan involves a social-interaction 
manipulation resulting in group (A^ ) and alone (A^ ) levels, and an 
information manipulation resulting in full information (B^), pro and 
con information (B^ ), risk-level information (B^), and no information 
(B^ ) levels. Thus, there are eight experimental conditions in all. The 
addition of apre-and posttest, repeated measures factor (q, <y pro-












One hundred twenty male and female students enrolled in intro­
ductory psychology oourses at the University of New Hampshire and at 
Nasson College in Springvale, Maine served as subjects. None of the sub­
jects had prior knowledge of the shift to risk phenomenon. Each subject 
was assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. In accordance with
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prior research procedures only like-sex subjects were run in any one 
experimental session.
Materials
Hie materials consisted of six items from the Choice Dilemma 
test which had previously been associated with strong shifts to risk 
(#'s 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11 from Kogan and Wallach, 1959— see Appendix) 
and verbatim transcripts of group discussions.
Procedure
All subjects were initially pretested on the risk-taking items. 
They were instructed to read the instructions printed on the test booklet 
and then were further instructed as follows:
There are two points I should like to bring to your attention 
which may seem clear enough at the outset, but are easily over-looked 
when you become involved in seme of the situations. The first is 
that alternative X— the riskier alternative— is always assumed to be 
more desirable than the safer course, if X should prove successful.
The second point concerns the meaning of the odds you are 
being asked to mark. It is not your task to decide what the odds 
might actually be in a lifelike situation. The odds you marie indicate 
the lowest odds you would be willing to take and still advise the 
central figure to give the risky alternative a try. There is no time 
limit so take your time and consider the 6 situations carefully. You 
may return to erne if you wish to change your answer after seeing some 
of the others. If there are no questions you nay begin.
Subjects ccnpleted the pretest and then, depending on which condition they
had been assigned to, were exposed to one of the following experimental
manipulations.
Group Conditions (A^ )
Half of the subjects were run under group conditions. They met 
five at a time and were seated around a large discussion table. There
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was a tape recorder present and subjects were told that it would be used 
to record their discussions. Subjects were then exposed to an experimental 
manipulation which represented one of the four information levels.
Full information (B^ ). This condition is simply a replication 
of the typical group discussion procedure. These instructions were given:
The questionnaire which you how have in front of you is the 
same one you just finished taking. We have had each of you fill out 
the questionnaire so that you would became familiar with all of the 
situations it contains. What we are really interested in is having 
you discuss each of the situations as a group. Let me now describe 
the purpose of these discussions. We are trying to develop a set of 
case motives for a hunan relations course. This means that we would 
like to develop situations for which people are likely to hold many 
different points of view. We want to see whether the situations we 
constructed will generate a diversify of opinions so your discussions 
will tell us hew well the different situations are working out for 
our purposes. I am not going to participate in the discussions although 
I will be here to answer any procedural questions which may arise. M l  
right, let's begin with the first item. Go right ahead.
When the discussion appeared complete the experimenter said the following:
M l  right. That was a good discussion. For some of you, it 
may have raised issues that you had overlooked when filling out the 
questionnaires the first time. New, we would like to find out whether 
the discussions influenced your judgment in any way. When making 
your decisions now, don't feel bound by what you did when filling out 
the questionnaire the first time. If you still feel the same way, 
that's quite all right but we should like you to consider each situation 
inthe light of the discussion. As I told you before, we're interested 
in seeing how much diversity of opinions is generated by each situation. 
Obviously the expression of such diversity should have seme impact 
on everyone's personal opinions. M l  right, go ahead and make your 
decisions for the first situation— the one you just discussed.
Pro and con information (B^ ). Subjects were directed to discuss 
each item. However, they were instructed to refrain from mentioning the 
exact level of risk each would advise. The instructions are the same as 
those used in the full-information condition except that the following 
phrases were added:
In discussing each item you should concentrate on pointing 
out the most important issues to be considered in making each decision. 
What do you feel are the pros and cons attached to the risky action?
You should not mention the exact level of risk you would reccrmend
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but only whether in your opinion the central figure should make a 
generally risky or a generally conservative decision.
There was a monitor present during each discussion to insure that no mention
was made of specific risk levels. As usual after each discussion subjects
were asked to indicate their posttest choices.
Risk-level information (B )^. This condition closely resembles 
the balloting condition of Teger and Pruitt. However, because of the 
interest in assuring vocal interaction subjects were instructed to speak 
their preferences rather than display them on cards. They were instructed 
as follows:
The questionnaires you have in front of you are the same 
ones you just finished taking. We had you take them the first time 
so that you would beccme acquainted with the various problem situations. 
What we would like you to do now is to exchange information concerning 
the decisions you have made. Each of you will indicate to the others 
what level of risk you have chosen for the problem situation. I will 
roll a die to determine who goes first and we will continue around 
the table in a clockwise direction. When you finish going around 
once repeat the procedure until you have done it three times. Remember 
that you are limited to indicating the odds you prefer. You are not 
allowed at this time to give reasons for your choice.
Consider what you are doing as a form of discussions. You 
are each getting an opportunity to ccnpare your initial decision 
with that of others. You are also given a chance to change your 
decisions if you wish to. Feel free to change your answers at any 
time. Remember, if this were the usual form of discussion, many of 
you would change your answers for various reasons during the course 
of the discussion. Always consider your own decision in light of 
others' decisions but in the end do whatever you think is best.
Please do not feel bound by what you marked as your decision on the 
practice booklet. Whether or not you change or how much you change 
is not important. Vfoat is important is that you reconsider each 
answer carefully.
Three rounds of balloting were held. When this was completed 
each subject was asked to make a final decision on each item.
Kb-information (Bj. This was a control condition. After
—  — — —  4
completion of the pretest subjects were handed copies of nonrisk items 
which they were to discuss. For this purpose the "doodlebug problem"
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developed by Rokeach (1960, pp. 171-181) was used. Subjects were instructed 
as follows:
Each of you new has a copy of what we call the doodlebug 
problem. It is a problem in logical reasoning. You are asked to 
describe the circumstances that Joe must have been in to lead him 
to his correct conclusion that only four jimps are required. We 
would now like you to discuss this problem as a group to see if 
among the five of you you can core to a correct solution concerning 
Joe's circumstances. You are to continue the discussion until all 
of you agree on what that correct solution must be. I will not 
take part in the discussion but I will be here to answer any procedural 
questions that arise. All right, begin if there are no questions.
When the discussions were finished the experimenter passed out new copies
of the risk-taking questionnaire. Subjects were instructed as follows:
The questionnaires you new have cure the same ones you took 
earlier. We would now like to have you go back over them and reconsider 
each item carefully. We are not interested in seeing if you can 
remember the answers you put down the first time.but rather we would 
like to have you rethink each problem. Sane new thoughts may occur to 
you that you did not consider first time. If you still feel the same 
way that is all right but we are interested in finding out what your 
personal decision is at this time.
Alone Conditions (A^ )
The following procedures pertain to subjects run in non-interacting 
conditions. For each condition subjects were run individually in isolated 
roans. They were allowed no opportunity to interact.
Full information (B^ ). Subjects in this condition were exposed 
to the full information that is engendered in a typical group discussion. 
Each subject was presented with a verbatim transcript of a previous group 
discussion. He was instructed as follows:
The questionnaire you new have in front of you is the same 
as the one you just finished taking. We had you take it the first 
time so you would become familiar with all the situations it contains.
Many people feel that they could make better choices on each 
item if they had more information concerning the problem situations.
In the past we have had various groups discuss each problem in order 
that we might get a better idea of the pros and cons involved in 
making each decision. In order that you might have a better idea
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of what these pros and cons are we have prepared a verbatim transcript 
of a typical discussion. We should like you to read the transcript 
and indicate in the spaces provided what other pros and cans you feel 
the group should have considered. Since you may not previously have 
considered sane of the information brought to light in the group 
discussion we would like you to reconsider each situation and make 
a new decision for each. If you do not wish to change your original 
decision that is perfectly all right. What is important is that you 
reconsider each decision in the light of the group discussion. Please 
mark what you feel to be the best decision.
Pro and con information (B2>. This condition was very similar 
to the full-information condition. Subjects were presented with verbatim 
transcripts of group discussions. However, the transcripts used were 
derived from the recordings made of the discussions in which subjects 
discussed pros and cons only and were not allowed to reveal risk-level 
information. Hie instructions used in the full-information condition 
were repeated here.
Risk-level information (B^ ). Subjects were asked to reconsider 
each of their initial decisions in the light of responses given by others. 
They were presented with the actual pretest risk preferences of other 
subjects who were being run in neighboring experimental roans at the same
/ '
time. Each subject remained alone in his roam and was individually (
instructed as follows:
The questionnaire you new have in front of you is the same 
one you gust finished taking, we had you take it the first time so 
that you would became familiar with all of the situations it contains.
Many people are interested in finding out how others respond 
to these same questions, we thought you would be interested in seeing 
how the other people present have responded. On the attached sheet 
you will find an account of hew other people present have actually 
answered. After looking at this information we would like you to 
go through and reconsider each of the problem situations. Hie way 
others answered may have brought new issues to mind. Please restudy 
each item and indicate on the questionnaire whatever your decision 
is at the present time. Do not feel bound by what you marked an the 
practice booklet the first time. Vhether you change or not is unim­
portant— we are only interested in seeing what your personal decision 
is now. You can take as much time as you need.
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No-information (B.). This represents the control condition ---------------4
for the non-interacting sessions. After taking the pretest, subjects 
were asked to work on the doodlebug problems by themselves. Following 
this they were given the same instructions for completing the posttest 
as in the interacting condition.
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RESULTS
A pretest and posttest risk-taking score was computed for each 
subject. This score represents the arithmetic sum of the subject's 
risk preferences over the six items. The risk preference is scored as 
a whole nunber. For example, if a subject chose 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in 
10, 5 in 10, 9 in 10, and 1 in 10 as his six risk preferences his score 
would be 30. The possible range of scores extends fran six (maximum 
risk) to 60 (maximun caution). Table 2 contains mean pre- and posttest 
scores for the fifteen subjects in each experimental condition.
Initial homogeneity of variance for the various samples can be 
assumed. An F maximum test (Winer, 1962) performed upon the initial 
samples yielded an F ratio of 3.44 (df = 19; k = 8) Which is not signifi­
cant at the .05 level.
An analysis of variance for repeated measures was performed on 
the individual risk scores. The results are presented in Table 3. The 
only significant main effect was due to the pre-post factor. Averaged 
across all treatment conditions there was a significant shift to risk 
from pretest to posttest. However, the presence of statistical interac­
tion effects indicates that this shift was not independent of either the 
information or social interaction factor.
Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be a greater shift to risk 
under group than under alone conditions. Hie main effect far the interac­
tion factor did not reach an acceptable level of statistical significance. 
However, the main effect for social interaction disregards pre and posttest 
differences. Hie important statistic for testing this hypothesis is the
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TABLE 2*















C1 30.67 35.33 27.93 27.00
A1
Post
C2 24.80 30.20 26.20 26.13
Alone
Pre
S. 30.60 33.13 37.60 28.13
A2 Post
C2 28.33 31.06 37.60 27.82
*Each entry represents the mean risk-taking scare (based on the sun of 
the risk preferences over all six items) for the 15 subjects serving in 
that condition. Lower scores signify greater risk taking.
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TABLE 3
Overall Analysis of Variance of Individual Risk Scores
Source df MS F
Between Subjects
Interaction level (A) 1 627.27 3.80
Information level (B) 3 416.58 2.52
A x B 3 373.90 2.27
Error^ 112 165.04
Within Subjects
Pre-Post level (C) 1 317.40 28.04**
A x C 1 79.35 7.01*
B x C 3 50.70 4.48*





F ratio for the A x C interaction. Hie significance of this ratio 
indicates that pre to post risk-taking shifts were dependent on level 
of social interaction. Figure 1 describes the nature of the statistical 
interaction. A test for sinple main effects (Winer, 1962) was used to 
determine the sources of this interaction. This test is summarized in 
Table 4.
TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Measures for Social 
Interaction Levels
Source df MS F
C for A^ 1 357.07 31.54**
C for 1 39.67 3.50
Errorw 112 11.32
«p<.ffi53-------------------------------------------------------------
The results of this test indicate that there vas a significant shift 
toward risk under interacting but not under non-interacting conditions.
Hypothesis 2 stated that the shift to risk would be greatest under 
full information, next greatest for pro and con information and also 
risk-level information, and smallest for the no-information or control 
condition. The main effect for information was not significant but there 
was a statistical interaction effect between information level and pre­
post level. The significance of the B x C interaction indicates that 
pre to post risk-taking shifts were dependent upon level of information 
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Risk Taking Shifts as a Function of Information Level
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the results of a test for sinple main effects performed upon the interac­
tion.
TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Measures far 
Information Levels
Source df MS F
C for 1 248.1 21.92**
C far B_ 
2
1 205.4 18.14**
C for B3 1 11.2 <1





The two significant F's indicate that there was a definite shift toward 
risk under full information and pro and con information but not under 
risk-level information and no information.
To determine if the magnitude of these shifts differed statis­
tically fran one another a special shift score was computed. Mean pre 
and post risk scores far each information level were obtained by averaging 
across the social interaction factor. Subtraction of the post score 




Mean Shift Soares Under Each Information Condition
B, B B
“  2 3 4
4.06 3.70 0.86 0.30
These shift scares were then compared by means of a Neman Keuls post 
hoc test (Winer, 1962). The results of this test indicated that shifts 
under both full information (B^ ) and pro and con information (B2) were 
greater than those under risk-level information (B^ ) and no information 
(B^ ). The shifts under full information and pro and con information 
were not significantly different from one another. Also, there was no 
difference between risk-level shifts and no information shifts. All of 
these shifts are averaged across social interaction levels.
Hypothesis 3 stated that the presentation of risk-level information 
and full information would evoke comparable shifts under both group and 
alone conditions virile shifts observed under other information levels 
would be different for non-interacting and interacting conditions. The 
F ratio for the A x B x C interaction was not significant and, thus, no 
support can be given to this hypothesis.
To gain further information about risk-taking shifts for specific 
experimental cells an analysis of sinple, sinple effects for the pre­
post factor was performed (Winer, 1962). The results are presented in 
Table 7.
Highly significant shifts to risk resulted fran both full- 
information and pro and can information conditions when these were 
combined with a group setting (C for A^B^; C for A^B2). Marginally
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance of Pre-Post Soores far Individual Cells
Source df MS F
C for AjB^ 1 258.14 22.80**
C for A^B2 1 213.34 18.85**
C for AjB3 1 22.54 1.99
C for 1 5.64 <1
C for AjB^ 1 38.54 3.40*
C for A2B2 1 32.03 2.82*
C for 1 0.00 <1
C for A„B. 




A^ = interaction = full information
A2 = no interaction = pro and con information
Bj = risk-level information 
C = pretest-posttest factor B = no information
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significant risky shifts (p .10) were obtained when full-infarmation and 
pro and con information were presented in an alone setting (C for 
C for * T*ie shifts in the other four experimental cells were small 
and did not approach an acceptable level of statistical significance.
To determine whether or not the magnitude of the four significant 
shifts differed fran one another mean shift scores were confuted and 
conpared (Table 8).
TARTR 8
Mean Shift Soores for Full-Information and Pro and Con 
Information Under Both Group and Alone Conditions
A1B1 a1b2 a2B2
5.77 5.33 2.27 2.07
The results of a Newman Keuls test indicate that the means in the group 
condition (A-jB^  and A^,) were significantly greater than the corresponding 
means in the alone condition (AjB^  and A ^ )  • Full-infarmation produced 
a significantly greater shift in the group condition than in the alone 
condition. The pro and con shift was also significantly greater under 
group than under alone conditions. There was no significant difference 
between full information and pro and con information when ccnpared under 
either interacting or no-interacting conditions. Thus, no greater shift 
was obtained under full information than under pro and con information 
regardless of level of social interaction.
In sun, both full information and pro and con information produced 
approximately equal shifts in risk taking. In the group condition these 
shifts were significantly larger than in the alone condition.
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DISCUSSION
Only one of the three hypotheses was confirmed by the data.
There was a significantly greater shift to risk under group than under 
alone conditions, Vhile definite risky shifts were obtained in an alone 
condition far both full information and pro and con information this 
informational effect was greatly enhanced by the addition of group inter­
action. Thus, there is strong reason to believe that the full risky 
shift is not a psuedo group effect. The shift could have been considered 
a pseudo group effect-if there had been little or no difference between 
group and alone conditions.
The second hypothesis was an extrapolation from Brown's value 
position. The prediction was that both risk-level and pro and con infor­
mation would evoke small shifts of comparable magnitude and that only 
when both factors were jointly incorporated into the set of stimulus 
conditions would the full shift occur. This expectation was emphatically 
disconfizmed. Shifts obtained from pro and con information alone were 
of approximately the same magnitude as the full information shifts. In 
contrast, risk-level information was strikingly ineffectual. No shifts 
occurred in the alone condition and only small nonsignificant shifts 
under group conditions. The difference between the pro and ccnneffect 
and the risk-level effect was highly significant. It appears on the 
basis of this data that a large portion of the variance can be accounted 
for by the oontentual arguments provided in group discussion while the 
role of risk-level exchange is negligible.
The third hypothesis was a specific deduction from Brown's theory.
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If the only information of relevance Is the risk levels of others the 
presentation of this information should be equally effective in both 
grot?) and alone conditions. Clearly, this was not the case. There vras 
no shift in the alone condition and a small nonsignificant shift in the 
group condition. These results follow the general trend observed in the 
other experimental cells, namely that group interaction acted to increase 
the posttest risk level. In sum, the interaction and information factors 
combined in an additive rather than an interactive fashion.
Taken as a whole, the pattern of results are in striking disaccord 
with Brown's notion of the value process. Brown explicitly disclaims the 
role of the substantive content of the discussions and, instead, insists 
that it is "...the information about other people's answers that makes 
individuals move toward greater risk after group discussion (p. 702)."
In this study information about other people's answers had little or no 
effect but the reasons behind the answers, the substantive arguments, had 
a great effect. Congruent with this finding are sane of the results 
from a study by 2ajone, Wblosin, Wblosin and Loh (1970). Vhen subjects 
responded alone or in the presence of others to a simple two-choice 
betting task the tendency over a series of 360 trials was a gradual shift 
in the conservative direction. As a consequence of hearing others respond 
first there was a slight retardation of this effect. The authors conclude 
that the sheer knowledge of others' answers does not produce a shift to 
either risk or conservatism, at least in a two-choice betting paradigm.
The results argue persuasively against both the leadership 
hypothesis and the responsibility-diffusion theory. Consider first the 
implications for the leadership hypothesis. In several of the experimental 
conditions in which a shift to risk occurred a high-risk leader, if
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present, had little opportunity to influence his fellow discussants. For 
example, in the pro and con only conditions each group member is ignorant 
of how the others actually answered. A high-risk member may present 
more relevant arguments for the risky action but he is deprived of the 
means for pointing out the ideal risky position. He cannot, for example, 
lead a member who opted for 7 in 10 to the more risky position of 3 in 
10. He kncws neither the other member's position nor has he any viable 
means for communicating his own. The leadership dimension is even further 
removed in the related condition where subjects did not interact but 
read the pro and con transcripts of the previous discussions. Certainly 
there was no leader in the usual sense of the word. Yet, intboth group 
and alone conditions there were definite shifts to risk. This, of course, 
merely indicates that the shift to risk can occur in the absence of 
explicit leadership. It does not indicate that a risky leader cannot 
produce a shift under more usual conditions. However, as noted earlier, 
other studies have failed to find a leadership effect.
The responsibility-diffusion theory holds that shared interactional 
experiences bring about the formation of affective bonds which in turn 
mediate a spread of responsibility. This, then, could hardly explain the 
occurrence of risky shifts in the two alone conditions where transcripts 
were read. Perhaps one could posit the occurrence of vicarious group 
experience as a response to the transcript and the subsequent formation 
of imaginary affective bonds resulting in a diffusion of responsibility 
and a subsequent shift to risk. This interpretation, while possible, is 
certainly non-parsimonious. At any rate the presence of a control condition 
(no information) in which subjects discussed irrelevant problems before 
taking the posttest appears to obviate this possibility. Any discussion,
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if this theory is correct, should stimulate the formation of affective 
bonds necessary fen: the diffusion of responsibility. Yet, in this condi­
tion the amount of shift was negligible. Perhaps only certain types of 
discussions promote responsibility diffusion. If so, the theory obviously 
needs to be revised to take this into account.
The results have little bearing on the familiarization hypothesis 
as proposed by Bateson (1966). It could be posited, though, that a type 
of familiarization was involved in those conditions in which subjects 
read transcripts of prior group discussions. However, the additional 
arguments were produced by outside sources rather than by the subjects 
themselves. Also, contrary to what Bateson would predict, these arguments 
by themselves were not sufficient to produce the full shift to risk. 
Nevertheless, a reasonable interpretation might be that the recognition 
of the relevance of additional information leads to an increased willing­
ness to support the risky action. Perhaps when this information is received 
in a group context the additional normative justification strengthens the 
effects of the arguments.
Relevant Argument Hypothesis
The relevant-argument position holds basically that the compre­
hension of relevant argixnents is the immediate antecedent of the shift 
to risk and that these arguments will have a more powerful effect when 
produced and reacted to by an interacting group than when presented alone.
Vfriat is needed is a new theory that will provide a comprehensive 
interpretation of the shift to risk process. Such a theory may be 
constructed by combining some of the assumptions of the value hypothesis 
with a comprehension approach.
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Assure first that any risk-taking item nay engage either the 
value on risk or the value on caution. If the item is a risk-oriented 
one it will tend to arouse implicit arguments supporting a risky position. 
On the basis of these considerations the individual advocates a relatively 
risky stand. Wien confronted by the additional arguments of others, also 
elicited by the shared value on risk, the individual becomes willing to 
advocate an even riskier stand. Perhaps the greater the number of un­
familiar but relevant arguments he is exposed to the more he will shift 
his decision toward the risky end of the scale. At any rate, these 
arguments will be effective whether they arise through the give and take 
of group discussion or whether they are presented in an individual 
familiarization paradigm. However, should they arise through a face to 
face discussion they take on additional salience and the result is a 
much stronger shift to risk.
Support far this last statement can be found in a recent study 
by Willems (1969). When asked to estimate how others will respond to 
risk-oriented items subjects consistently guess that these others will 
respond more conservatively than themselves (Hinds, 1962; Vkllach and 
Wing, 1968; Levinger and Schneider, 1969). Willems ccnpared groups and 
individuals on this estimation index. He found that groups are even more 
likely than individuals to report that they are taking more risk than 
others. Willems suggests that group interaction increases the salience 
of the value specified, ftiis increased salience may be due to norm- 
sending processes within the group. Whatever the case, the group 
recognition of the risky value may well act as an extra weighting 
mechanism for risk-supporting arguments.
In short, it is proposed that presence of additional information
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is the most direct cause of the shift to risk. This assumes seme sort 
of comprehension process. The stimulus for the production of these argu­
ments in a group setting can be found in the value mechanism. This value 
becomes more salient when it is recognized by five people rather than 
just one and it is this increased salience that serves to give greater 
weight to the group-produced arguments. Thus, the shift to risk will be 
of a greater magnitude in a group than an individual context even though 
the specific information is the same for both.
A proposal which is similar in some respects has recently been 
made by Madaras and Bern (1968). They suggest that ..the crucial infor­
mation transmitted in the group is not about the risk levels of others, 
according to this hypothesis, but about specific information regarding 
the situation being discussed (p. 359)." To test their conjecture they 
split a ten-item Choice Dilemma questionnaire into two five-item subtests. 
After completing the full ten-item pretest groups discussed one of the 
five-item subtests and following discussion made new choices on the full 
ten-item test. The authors reasoned that if the crucial information 
transmitted in discussion is, as Brown suggests, the risk levels of 
others then subjects would become aware of their relative risk positions 
in the group and would alter their subsequent decisions an both the 
discussed and undiscussed items. Since significant shifts occurred only 
for the items actually discussed the authors concluded that Brown's risk- 
level hypothesis cannot account for the results while their specific 
argument hypothesis can.
Unfortunately, the Madaras and Bern study is very wBak. First, it 
is not at all clear that this prediction can be deduced from Brown's 
hypothesis. In fact, it would be reasonable to assure that a hypothetical
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subject who begins with the assumption that he is relatively risky com­
pared to others would hold to this view until specifically discontinued. 
Although he may receive contradictory information on the items actually 
discussed he may still assume that he is relatively risky on others. 
Secondly, this study is in no sense a test of the specific argument 
hypothesis. There was no direct manipulation of the amount or type of 
arguments involved. In fact, their conclusion is built on support by 
default. Since, in their opinion, the risk-level hypothesis was discon- 
firmed the specific-argunent hypothesis mist have been supported. However, 
disaffirming one hypothesis does not necessarily lend support to another. 
The results could equally well be construed as support for the leadership 
hypothesis or the comprehension hypothesis. In fact, either of these 
conclusions would seem more appropriate. There was no group interaction 
and thus no leader on the last five items nor were there any instructions 
given for further individual study. In sum, the experiment neither 
disaffirms Brown's hypothesis nor supports that of Madaras and Bern.
The Madaras and Bern report is the only one avowedly concerned 
with the relevant argument hypothesis. However, several other studies 
provide data that can be reinterpreted in terms of this mechanism.
The most immediately relevant study is NordhfzJy's (1962) master's 
thesis. After listening to the tapes of Stoner's original discussion 
groups Nordh^y devised a content analysis scheme for categorizing the 
verbal content of the discussions. Individual statements were classified 
into those favoring risk and those favoring caution. The consistent 
finding was that mare arguments favoring risk always preceded a shift to 
risk and more arguments favoring caution always preceded a shift to 
conservatism. Nordhtfy felt that the arguments expressed tended to be a
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reflection of values commonly accepted in the culture. This was actually 
the first statement of a value hypothesis which was later extended and 
refined by Brown (1965). Far our purposes the important point is that 
NOrdhfrfy adduces evidence that relevant arguments play a role in the shift 
to risk. The position to be defended here is that these arguments are 
a direct cause of the shift to risk.
Consider also the Kogan and Vfallach (1967c) study in which 
individual subjects listened to tape recordings of groups discussing the 
Choice Dilemma items. The major finding was that subjects in the listening 
conditions shewed a shift to risk which, although statistically significant, 
was consistently smaller than that for the discussion groups. The experi­
menters interpreted these results as providing negative evidence with 
respect to the value and comprehension formulations but supporting 
evidence for their own responsibility-diffusion theory. However, the 
results also fit in neatly with the relevant-argument hypothesis. In 
the listening condition subjects became aware of additional arguments 
relevant to each problem item. Thus, the weight of these additional 
considerations prompted them to opt for greater risk in the posttest. 
However, since these arguments did not arise through face-to-face inter­
action that directly involved the subject they were deprived of partici­
pation in the development of a group norm favoring risk, in the original 
discussion, however, group members were exposed to the identical arguments 
that the listeners heard yet the resulting shift was of a significantly 
greater magnitude. This finding is compatible with our two-process 
relevant-argument hypothesis. In the original interacting condition 
the same argixnents had a stronger effect due to the additional normative 
salience.
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Several studies (Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Clark and Willems, 1969) 
have shown that a small but significant shift results when group members 
exchange risk-level information but do not enter into a substantive 
discussion. The current investigation found a small, hut nonsignificant 
shift for this condition. Such a finding, in addition to offering support 
for Brown's risk-level hypothesis, would seem to militate against the 
relevant-argument hypothesis. Consider, however, the instructions typically 
given in this condition. To justify his manipulation in the eyes of the 
subject the experimenter usually indicates that the purpose of this procedure 
is to see if the diversity of views expressed will cedi to mind additional 
considerations that the subject has not previously thought of. Part of 
Teger and Pruitt's final instructions for this condition read "...possibly 
by comparing notes with each other and reconsidering each problem.. .you 
will have a better idea of the kind of decision that you would like to 
make." In addition, subjects are told, "consider what you are doing as 
a farm of discussion" and "you might want to change your decision after 
comparing it with others and thinking about it longer." It is quite 
possible that the subjects construed the enphasis on "comparing notes," 
"reconsidering each problem," and "thinking about it longer" as enocurag- 
Lig them to think of additional pros and cans relevant to the problem 
situation. This would render the condition similar to a familiarization 
paradigm. However, if we assume that the subject originally thought of 
relatively risk-provoking arguments and now finds that certain others 
are even riskier he may well try to think of other pro-risk arguments 
that could support this position. In addition, his involvement in the 
interactional process may serve to initiate normative weighting for the 
argraents he has already thought of. Such a procedure could conceivably
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lead to a posttest shift to risk. The shift would be small, however, 
because of the severe constraint on the information-exchange process.
Strong support for the risk-level hypothesis appears to be given 
in the recent study by Vidmar (1968). Included in his results is an 
internal analysis of the degree of shift exhibited by each group member 
on each item. In general, the amount of shift for each of the other 
group members was inversely proportional to his rank ordering in the group. 
Thus the individual who held the lowest rank, i.e. the most conservative 
member, shifted the most, the second most conservative member shifted 
slightly less, and so on until we reach the high-risk individual who did 
not shift at all. This is directly in line with Brown's proposal that 
if an individual values risk, the farther behind the others he finds 
himself the more catching up he has to do. However, the relevant-argument 
position holds that an individual's initial responses depend on the pros 
and cons he is able to think up for himself. If he can think up few 
arguments in favor of the risky action he is likely to take a moderate 
or conservative position, When he then enters into group discussion he 
is likely to discover many additional pro-risk arguments. In ffct, the 
greater the number of new arguments he hears the more he should shift.
The high-risk individual has already thought up many pro-risk arguments 
and thus is likely to hear few if any novel arguments. Consequently his 
shift is small or nonexistent. It is also plausible to assume that a 
moderate-risk individual has taken his position on the basis of a smaller 
number of pro-risk arguments. Wien he hears additional arguments he is 
justified in shifting toward greater ride. Of course, matters are 
probably not this sinple. In addition to the absolute number of arguments 
their relative importance and perceived relevance should also have an
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effect. Obviously this interpretation is ad hoc and would have to be 
tested on the basis of new data. What is inportant though is that 
Vidmar's results do not provide unambiguous support for the risk-level 
hypothesis.
Vidmar's results are paralleled to sane extent by the findings 
of Wallach and Mabli (1970). Three-person discussion groups were formed 
with either a conservative majority or a risky majority. In both condi­
tions the initially conservative members showed strong, approximately 
equal shifts to risk while the risky members evinced snail, nonsignificant 
shifts to conservatism. Pursuing his new-found devotion to value theory, 
Wallach interprets these results as especially dramatic evidence in favor 
of the exchange-of-risk-levels hypothesis. Again, however, a lively 
possibility is that the conservatives shifted because they were exposed 
to new arguments in favor of the risky solution. Assuming an initial 
value on risk they were new provided with additional justification for 
moving toward a more desirable risk level. Risk takers, on the other 
hand, probably were not exposed to additional risky arguments and, in 
fact, may have been confronted with sane of the cautious concerns of 
the conservative members. This may have accounted for the small, insig­
nificant trend toward conservatism.
To recapitulate, the model presented here consists of four basic 
propositions. First, each problem situation will elicit the value on 
risk, the value on conservatism, or no value at all (in which case there 
will be no consistent shifts in risk taking). This is in line with 
Brown's initial value famulation and the evidence to date (e.g. Stoner, 
1968) sasms to indicate that this is a viable assumption. Second, when 
deciding upon an initial response each individual will take into
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consideration sane of the pros and cons attached to the risky action.
The amount of risk he takes will depend, in part, on the number of risky 
arguments he is able to produce and the importance he attaches to each. 
Third, individual shifts to risk will occur as a function of the respon­
dent being presented with additional relevant arguments or other informa­
tion that increases the importance of arguments he has already produced. 
Fourth, the magnitude of these shifts will be greatly increased when 
this additional information grows out of an interactional context of 
which the individual is a part. It was suggested that the mechanism 
responsible for this last step may be the increased salience given to 
risky arguments as a function of group recognition of the value. When 
caution-oriented items are involved the model should work in analogous 
fashion to produce conservative shifts.
Implications for Future Research
Since the model is presented a posteriori rather than a priori 
it is clearly in need of an independent test. Future research could 
proceed along several lines. Perhaps the most fruitful first step would 
be a replication of the present design using both risk-oriented and 
caution-oriented items. The model predicts small shifts to conservatism 
when additional conservative arguments are presented in an individual 
familiarization paradigm and significantly larger shifts to conservatism 
when the same arguments arise through group discussion. These shifts 
should occur regardless of whether or not the announcement of initial 
risk levels aooarpanies the relevant arguments. Any theory which proposes 
to account for the shift to risk must also account for those instances 
in which there is a shift to conservation. The explanation gains
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generality if both types of shift can be accounted far by invoking the 
same theoretical processes.
As previously mentioned the first proposition has already received 
considerable empirical support. On those items which shift to risk 
people see others as taking less risk than they themselves (Hinds, 1962; 
Stoner, 1968; Whllach and Wing, 1968; Levinger and Schneider, 1969). In 
addition, they also see the ideal level of risk as being slightly riskier 
than their original answers (Levinger and Schneider, 1969). Stoner 
(1968) has shown that on risk-shifting items subjects consistently rank 
value statements associated with the risky alternative as more important 
than value statements associated with the conservative alternative.
Also, risk-aooepbors are viewed more favorably than risk-rejectors 
(Madaras and Bern, 1968). Thus, it seems reasonable to postulate that 
risky items evoke seme sort of widely shared value on risk. However, 
it remains to extend these value-specification indices to group betting 
situations of the type used by Pruitt and Teger (1969) and the problem- 
solving formats of wailach, Kogan and Bern (1965).
The evidence is not as clear with respect to cautious items. 
Levinger and Schneider found that on the two Choice Dilemma items that 
had previously shown shifts to conservation there was a tendency for 
others to be seen as holding riskier positions. However, ideal choices 
were also seen as somewhat more risky than subjects' own positions.
Stoner (1968) tested six caution-oriented items, two made up by Nordhtfy 
(1962) and four which he constructed in an attempt to elicit cautious 
values. On five of these subjects saw others as being mare risky. On 
all six there was a tendency to rank the value statement associated 
with the conservative alternative as more important than the value
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statement associated with the risky alternative. Unfortunately, only 
two of the six items showed significant shifts to conservatism while 
for one there was actually a significant shift to risk (this was the 
item on which subjects saw others as being more conservative). Evidently 
shifts to conservatism are much harder to produce than shifts to risk. 
Future research should concentrate more heavily an the conditions under 
which shifts to conservatism will or will not occur. Brown (1965) 
suggests that items will go conservative when the vital interests of 
others are at stake. Rabow et. al. (1966) feel that conservative shifts 
will be obtained when the risky action conflicts with societal norms. 
However, several of Stoner's four items which failed to shew a conservative 
shift did involve the vital welfare of others (items #1 and #6 of the 
Stoner list) and one of his two successful conservative shifts was found 
for an item which neither involved the vital interests of others nor 
seemed to be in conflict with any widely accepted norms (item #2). A 
new approach seems warranted. This might involve scaling the perceived 
reinforcement value of the gain versus the perceived magnitude of the 
stake. Perhaps when the stake outweights the gain there will be a 
tendency to shift to conservatism. It would appear that the most important 
contribution that could be made to the risk-shift literature would be 
the development of a general prescription that would specify in advance 
how a risk-shifting or conservative-shifting item should be constructed. 
Besides contributing to our understanding of the shift phenomenon the 
existence of such a prescription would, as Brown points out, "...be a 
general statement about American culture (p. 705)."
The second proposition has not yet been tested. There is evidence 
to shew that people initially answer risk-shifting items in a relatively
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risky fashion and conservative-shifting items in a relatively cautious 
fashion (Pruitt and Teger, 1967? Stoner, 1968). Hcwever, this does not 
necessarily indicate that they do so on the basis of implicit risky or 
conservative arguments or, further, that the number or perceived importance 
of such argunents bears any relation to the extremity of the response.
It is probably impossible to ascertain with any certainty what goes on 
in a person's mind when lie is making a decision. You could ask him 
afterwards to indicate the pros and cons he considered but there is 
always the possibility that his post-decision responses represent justi­
fications rather than true antecedents. Inquiring before the decision 
is made probably constitutes an invasion and disruption of the natural 
ongoing process. Despite these factors, however, we would expect that 
the number and perceived importance of the relevant arguments reported 
by the subject should bear some relation to the degree of risk actually 
taken. One could proceed by asking the subject to list the pros and 
cons attached to the risky action and to indicate by means of a rating 
scale how important each is for the making of the decision. The relevant- 
argument theory holds that on risk-oriented items the pros will outnumber 
the cons and further that the average degree of impart attached to the 
pro statements will outweigh the import of the con statements. In 
addition, across subjects there should be a positive correlation between 
number of pros adduced and initial risk. Perceived inpart of the risky 
arguments should also correlate positively with initial risk. Negative 
correlations should be found between number and importance of conservative 
argunents and initial risk. Such evidence, if found, would constitute 
support for our second proposition and might be useful as an additional 
index for distinguishing between risk-shifting and conservative-shifting
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items.
The third proposition is the most crucial since it presents a 
major alternative to the exchange-of-risk-levels hypothesis. Hie conten­
tion that the presentation of additional relevant argunents is an immediate 
cause of the shift to risk can easily be tested. Hie most direct approach 
is to simply present additional risky or conservative arguments in an 
individual familiarization paradigm. Posttest responses should show a 
net shift to risk on risk-oriented items and to conservatism on caution- 
oriented items. But vftat would be the effect of presenting additional 
conservative arguments for a risk-oriented item? According to the relevant- 
argument approach there would be a tendency to shift in the conservative 
direction. However, since the value specifies risk the net shift should 
be small; smaller than the risky shift when risky arguments are presented. 
Conservative arguments should not be weighed as heavily as risky arguments. 
In fact, this contention can easily be tested by presenting both types of 
argunents and asking the subject to rate the perceived importance of each.
As a corollary to this third proposition we could posit that 
the magnitude of the shift will be a positive function of the nurber of 
unfamiliar argunents provided. A direct measure of this can be obtained 
if we ask the subject to specify pros and cans before the initial response 
and eliminate from the familiarization material the arguments that he 
has already thought of. A similar relationship should hold when we take 
into consideration the perceived importance of the new arguments; the 
greater the sunmated ratings for perceived importance the greater the 
degree of shift.
The last proposition, that these argunents should have greater 
effect when presented in an interactional context, is not as easy to 
test. The presentation of individual arguments is rather readily controlled
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by the experimenter but the manipulation of discussion is an entirely 
different matter. A restricted ccmnunication paradigm where the subject 
cannunicates to others by written message provides a possible approach.
The experimenter could directly control the group discussion content 
through the introduction of bogus messages. Hcwever, such a set up would 
represent little mare than an individual familiarization paradigm. The 
only added component is the inpression of interaction with others and the 
effect of the inpression may not add up to the effect of the real thing.
A second possible approach is analogous to the one used here. Allow a 
normal group discussion and abstract the relevant arguments front a tran­
script of the proceedings. The presentation of the same argiments in a 
non-interactional setting should produce a shift, but one considerably 
smaller than in the actual discussion. Perhaps the best approach would 
be the employment of confederates in the group discussion. The confederates 
are provided with a standard list of relevant arguments and are instructed 
to insert these argunents at appropriate times in the course of the dis­
cussion. By employing say four confederates and one naive subject the 
experimenter should retain fairly good control over the verbal content 
fran one group discussion to the next. The prediction, of course, is 
that the same argunents will have a significantly greater effect when 
deliberately presented in a group-context than when presented alone.
In sun, the relevant-arguient hypothesis has not yet been subjected 
to a critical test on the basis of independent data. However, the 
importance of collecting such data now seems clear.
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On the following pages, you will find a series of situations that 
are likely to occur in everyday life. The central person in each situation 
is faced with a choice between two alternative courses of action, which 
we might call X and Y. Alternative X is more desirable and attractive 
than alternative Y, but the probability of attaining or achieving X is less 
than that of attaining or achieving Y.
For each situation on the following pages, you will be asked to 
indicate the minimum odds of success you would demand before reccrmending 
that the more attractive or desirable alternative X be chosen.
Read each situation carefully before giving your judgment. Try 
to place yourself in the position of the central person in each of the 
situations. There are six situations in all. Please do not emit any 
of them.
1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one child, has 
been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating from 
college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest, 
though adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement.
On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase much 
before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job 
with a small, newly founded company which has a highly uncertain future.
The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a 
share in the ownership if the company survived the competition of the 
larger firms.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several proba­
bilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
to mate it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new 30b.
The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
willThe chances should be at least 3 in 10 that the company prove
financially sound.
willThe chances should be at least 5 in 10 that the company prove
financially sound.
willThe chances should be at least 7 in 10 that the company prove
financially sound.
The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take the new job
unless it is certain that the company would survive.
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2. Mr. B, a competent chess player is participating in a national chess 
tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored player in the 
tournament as his opponent. Mr. B has been given a relatively lew ranking 
in view of his performance in previous tournaments. During the course 
of his play with the top-favored man, Mr. B notes the possibility of a 
deceptive though risky maneuver which might bring him a quick victory. At 
the same time, if the attempted maneuver should fail, Mr. B would be left 
in an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly follow.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several proba­
bilities or odds that Mr. B's deceptive play would succeed.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
for the risky play in question to be attempted.
 Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not attempt the risky
play unless its success could be assured.
The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that the risky pi^y would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that the risky play would
succeed.
3. Mr. C, a married 30-year-old research physicist, has been given a five 
year appointment by a major university laboratory. As he contemplates 
the next five years, he realizes that he might work on a difficult, long­
term problem which, if a solution could be found, would resolve basic 
scientific issues in the field and bring high scientific honors. If no 
solution were found, however, Mr. C. would have little to shew for his 
five years in the laboratory, and this would make it hard for him to get 
a good job afterwards. On the other hand, he could, as most of his pro­
fessional associates are doing, work on a series of short-term problems 
where solutions would be easier to find, but where the problems are of 
lesser scientific importance.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that a solution would be found to the difficult 
long-term problem that Mr. C has in mind.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
to make it worthwhile for Mr. C to work on~tfie more difficult long-term 
problem.
 Place a check here if you think Mr. C should not choose the long­
term difficult problem unless he is certain to find a solution.
 The Chances should be at least 9 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
 The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
 The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
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 The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
 Hie chances should be at least 1 in 10 that Mr. C would solve the
problem.
4. Mr. D, a college senior, has studied the piano since childhood, He 
has won amateur prizes and given small recitals, suggesting that Mr. D 
has considerable musical talent. As graduation approaches, Mr. D has the 
choice of going to medical school to become a physician, a profession which 
would bring certain prestige and financial rewards; or entering a conservatory 
of music for advanced training with a well-known pianist. Mr. D realizes 
that even upon completion of his piano studies, which would take many more 
years and a lot of money, success as a concert pianist would not be assured.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. D. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that Mr. D would succeed as a concert pianist.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
for Mr. D to continue with his musical training.
 The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
  The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
 The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
 The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
  The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that Mr. D would succeed as
a concert pianist.
  Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not pursue his musical
training unless he was certain to succeed as a concert pianist.
5. Mr. F is currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue graduate 
study in chemistry leading to the Doctor of Philosophy degree. He has been 
accepted by both University X and University Y. University X has a world­
wide reputation for excellence in chemistry. While a degree from University 
X would signify outstanding training in this field, the standards are so 
very rigorous that only a fraction of the degree candidates actually 
receive the degree. University Y, on the other hand, has much less of a 
reputation in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor 
of Philosophy degree, though the degree has much less prestige than the 
corresponding degree from University X.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that Mr. F. would be awarded a degree at University X, 
the one with the greater prestige.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
to make it worthwhile for Mr. F to enrollTir-Jmveriity X rather than 
University Y.
 Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not enroll in University
X unless he is certain to be awarded toe degree.
 The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.
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The chances should be at least 7 
degzee fran University X.
The chances should be at least 5 
degree from University X.
Hie chances should be at least 3 
degree fran University X.
The chances should be at least 1 
degree fran University X.
in 10 that Mr. P would receive a
in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
6. Mr. H is the captain of College X's football team. College X is playing 
its traditional rival, College Y, in the final game of the season. The 
game is in its final seconds, and Mr. H's team, College X, is behind in 
the score. College X has time to run one more play. Mr. H, the captain, 
must decide whether it would be best to settle for a tie score with a 
play which would be almost certain to work or, on the other hand, should 
try a more complicated and risky play which could bring victory if it 
succeeded but defeat if not.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. H. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that the risky play would prove successful.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
for the risky play to be attempted.
 The chances should be at least 1 in 10 that the risky play will work.
 The chances should be at least 3 in 10 that the risky play will work.
 The chances should be at least 5 in 10 that the risky play will work.
 The chances should be at least 7 in 10 that the risky play will work.
 The chances should be at least 9 in 10 that the risky play will work.
 Place a check here if you feel that the risky play should not be
attempted unless Mr. H was certain that it would work.
